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Abstract:
Purpose: In information economy era, innovation is the key to improve the competitiveness of
enterprises. The traditional way of  enterprise innovation is outdated and supply chain
collaborative innovation has becoming popular. This paper aims to analyze the mechanism of
knowledge sharing between enterprises in supply chain collaborative innovation.
Design/methodology/approach: This paper analyzes the supply chain members’ willingness
to share knowledge by using the game theory. The result of  knowledge sharing between two
companies is analyzed by using the evolutionary game.
Findings: We broke the knowledge sharing process in supply chain collaborative innovation
into knowledge mining and knowledge transferring. We got the best knowledge sharing strategy
of  each supply chain member. We gave the influencing factors of  knowledge sharing between
members for the knowledge sharing mechanisms in supply chain collaborative innovation.
Research limitations/implications: We didn’t study the willingness of  more than two supply
chain members to share knowledge and the result of  knowledge sharing between them. And
this situation is more realistic.
Practical implications: Our findings can help to improve the effect of  knowledge sharing in
supply chain collaborative innovation.
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Originality/value: The paper introduces the game theory to knowledge sharing between
members in supply chain collaborative innovation, deepens the understanding of  knowledge
sharing in supply chain collaborative innovation, and gives some interesting findings.
Keywords: game theory, knowledge sharing, collaborative innovation, supply chain
1. Introduction
From the late 20th century to the early 21st century, the rapid development of computer
technology, especially the rapid application of the internet, has made the transfer and the
sharing of information more quickly and easily. A supply chain constitutes of several
enterprises that cooperate with each other. The development of the information technology has
accelerated the transmission of information between all enterprises in the supply chain and
facilitates knowledge sharing between them. Moreover, in information economy era, innovation
is the key to improve the competitiveness of the enterprise. However, the enterprise innovates
all by itself cannot bring the innovation of the entire supply chain, which brings supply chain
collaborative innovation. Supply chain collaborative innovation means in order to improve the
market competitiveness and interests of the supply chain, all supply chain members, including
suppliers, manufacturers, vendors, etc., innovate together and collaborate with each other in
production, logistics, and marketing.
Obviously, supply chain collaborative innovation occurred among many companies and it has
many special problems compared with the enterprise innovates alone. The most important
problems are listed below. The first problem is the distribution of benefits. The most important
purpose of supply chain collaborative innovation is to promote the interests of supply chain
members. However, each enterprise wants to maximize its own profit. Then, how to distribute
benefits among all supply chain members is the most important problem. The second problem
is the integration of different corporate cultures. Each enterprise has its own unique corporate
culture, and supply chain collaborative innovation requires companies to work together, then it
is important for supply chain members to integrate their cultures. The third problem is
knowledge sharing between supply chain members. Knowledge sharing within an enterprise
has always been a big problem. And knowledge sharing between supply chain members is a
more difficult problem. In order to solve these problems, this paper analysis the knowledge
sharing mechanism of enterprises in the supply chain collaborative innovation.
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2. Related Research
The traditional way of enterprise innovation is enterprise innovates all by itself. However, this
way cannot accelerate the operational efficiency of the entire supply chain and may also
increase the cost of the upstream and downstream enterprises. Therefore, scholars began to
study supply chain collaborative innovation. Bello et al. believed all supply chain members
must participate in collaborative innovation and build management model of collaborative
innovation (Bello, Lohtia & Sangtani, 2004). Choi et al. analyzed all aspects of the supply chain
and found that the efficiency and cost of a supply chain have a certain relationship to
collaborative innovation (Choi & Krause, 2006). 
In order to achieve collaborative innovation, it is necessary for supply chain members to build
a knowledge alliance and share knowledge with each other. Scholars defined knowledge
sharing from the following angles.
2.1. The Flow of Knowledge
Holthouse thought knowledge is a flow and knowledge sharing is the exchange process
between knowledge owners and knowledge recipients (Holthouse, 2006). Hendriks proposed
the knowledge sharing process is the communication process among supply chain members.
And each member should have its own knowledge that can be shared with others (Hendriks,
1999). Lee thought that knowledge sharing is knowledge transferred from an individual or
organization to another individual or organization (Lee, 2001). Bartol and Srivastava believed
knowledge sharing is employees delivering and transferring relevant information in the
enterprise (Batrol & Srivastave, 2002). Connelly and Kelloway found in addition to exchange of
information, knowledge sharing also can help other companies in many ways (Connelly &
Kelloway, 2003).
2.2. Information Exchange
Tan proposed that sharing is exchanging (Tan, 1994). Davenport and Prusak compared the
process of knowledge sharing to commodities exchanging, which contains buyers and sellers
that can exchange knowledge in the knowledge market (Davenport & Prusak, 1999). 
2.3. Organizational Learning
Senge believed that knowledge sharing is not just the transmission of knowledge, but also
includes the process of absorption of the received knowledge (Senge, 2006). Dixon (2000)
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thought knowledge sharing is not only means knowledge is accepted to both sides but also
means knowledge is accepted to all organizations (Dixon, 2000).
Currently, scholars have no uniform definition of the knowledge sharing mechanism. O'Dell and
Grayson believed that knowledge sharing is composed of four parts; they are information
system, organizational structure, corporate culture, and evaluation system (O’Dell & Grayson,
1998). Ruggles found corporate culture is the biggest factors hindering knowledge sharing
(Ruggles, 1998).
3. Knowledge Sharing Process in Supply Chain Collaborative Innovation
According to Hansen's knowledge-sharing process stage, we break knowledge sharing process
in supply chain collaborative innovation into knowledge mining and knowledge transferring.
3.1. Knowledge Mining
In supply chain collaborative innovation, knowledge mining refers to supply chain members to
explore the knowledge source. On one hand, main sources of knowledge are the market and
customers, and knowledge about the market and customers is generally provided by the
vendors. Because in the supply chain, vendors is the closest to the customers, and they are
easy to understand market situation and customer needs.
On the other hand, the goal of supply chain collaborative innovation is to reduce cost, which is
related to each supply chain member. Only under the circumstance of collaborative innovation
can all supply chain members minimize cost, otherwise there may be only a single enterprise
can reduce its cost. In the case of reduce cost, all supply chain members are sources of
knowledge.
Thus, each supply chain members may be the source of knowledge. An enterprise provides
knowledge to another enterprise is the knowledge mining process, which is the first stage of
knowledge sharing. Because the prerequisite of knowledge sharing is the knowledge source is
willing to provide knowledge. Only when it is willing to provide knowledge, the knowledge
sharing activities can continue. Therefore, we must understand the distribution of knowledge in
supply chain members.
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3.2. Knowledge Transferring
Knowledge transferring is the second step of knowledge sharing. Generally, knowledge
transferring is divided into three parts: knowledge transmission, knowledge absorption, and
knowledge feedback.
If it is a simple knowledge, after knowledge mining, both sides of knowledge sharing only have
to transfer knowledge once. But if it is a complex knowledge, then the process of knowledge
transfer must be taken more than once. Moreover, because knowledge is easy to be lost and
misinterpreted, sharing knowledge repeatedly becomes more important, which also results in
knowledge sources have to continuously provide knowledge to knowledge sharing parties.
Meanwhile, in a number of knowledge transfer and absorption process, parties may incur
additional knowledge, the transmission of this knowledge back to the sources of knowledge is
knowledge feedback. Repeated knowledge transfer, absorption, and feedback form a complete
knowledge transfer process. It is specific shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Process of Knowledge Transferring
4. Prisoner’s Dilemma of Knowledge Sharing
Knowledge sharing in supply chain collaborative innovation environment occurs among all
supply chain members. And the goal of each enterprise is to maximize its own interests.
Companies game with each other and choose their best knowledge sharing strategies at last.
The willingness of knowledge sharing of each enterprise in the supply chain is not completely
transparent, and their knowledge is independent of each other. Especially in the dissemination
and sharing of tacit knowledge, supply chain members’ game all the time. As the Prisoner's
Dilemma, when a participating company does not know whether another participator shares its
knowledge or not, it can choose to share or not to share knowledge. Thus, there exist three
kinds of results.
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(1) If both two participators choose to share knowledge, both of them can get knowledge
provided by the other side. Then they can get the optimal solution (9,9).
(2) If Company A choose to share knowledge, but Company B choose not to share knowledge,
Company A will lose a unit payoff while Company B will get an extra unit payoff. Thus, they can
get the solution (-1, 10).Otherwise, they get the solution (10,-1).
(3) If both Company A and B choose not to share knowledge, both of them cannot get any
payoff. Then they only can get the solution (0,0).
The payoff matrix is shown in Table 1.
A
B
To share Not to share
To share (9,9) (10,-1)
Not to share (-1,10) (0,0)
Table 1. Payoff Matrix of Company A and B
4.1. Game analysis
We assume there are a seller, a manufacturer, and a supplier in a supply chain and they are
work together in collaborative product innovation. Since product innovation is mainly done by
the manufacturer, then the manufacturer is the leader, the vendor and the supplier are the
followers. Specific variables are as follows:
(1) There are 1 leader company and 2 follower companies. Assuming the knowledge
production of the leader company is q1 and the knowledge production of the follower company
is q2. And the follower decides its knowledge production based on the knowledge production of
the leader. Then, we can get S: (q1  q2).
(2) In the Stackelberg model, the amount of knowledge provided by the company is the cost
and the cost of a company is related to its products. 
(3) Assuming the inverse demand function is:
(1)
The cost is: 
(2)
c is the fixed cost of per unit production.
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The profit is:
(3)
(4) The knowledge production of the leader is q1, and then the best strategy of the follower is:
(4)
As the follower determines its knowledge production based on the decision of the leader, then
when marginal revenue equals marginal cost the follower maximizes its profit. The knowledge
production of the follower is:
(5)
(5) The leader knows the follower decides q2 based on q1, so we can get the profit of the leader
based on q2:
(6)
By first order optimization, we can get:
(7)
(8)
(6) At last we can get the outcome of the Nash equilibrium.
Balanced Results:
(9)
Equilibrium:
(10)
By using the Stackelberg model, we find the best strategy of both the leader and the follower
is to share knowledge.
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5. Evolutionary Game of Knowledge Sharing
In knowledge sharing among companies, each company has two choices: to share knowledge
with another company or not. This paper will study the knowledge sharing mechanism between
two companies. To study how many equilibriums these two companies can reach, and the
probability of each equilibriums, and how to promote knowledge sharing between these two
companies is of great significance.
The basic idea of evolutionary game is that the participator with bounded rationality is
impossible to find the best strategy trough a game. The participator can find the best strategy
only by imitating and improving the strategies of itself and others in the past. Through a long
period of imitation and improvement, each participator will tend to find a stable strategy, which
is named Evolutionary Stable strategy (ESS). Because the decision maker of each company
has bounded rationality in the fact, this paper studies knowledge sharing among companies by
using evolutionary game.
When a company does not know whether another participator shares its knowledge or not, it
can choose to share or not to share knowledge. Thus, there exist three kinds of results.
(1) If both Company A and B choose not to share knowledge, they only can get the solution
(a, a).
(2) If Company A choose to share knowledge, but Company B choose not to share knowledge,
Company A will lose d units payoff while Company B will get c units extra payoff. Thus, they
can get the solution (a–d, a+c). Otherwise, they get the solution (a+c, a–d).
(3) If both two companies choose to share knowledge, both of them can get knowledge
provided by each other. Then they can get the optimal solution (a+b, a+b).
The payoff matrix is shown in Table 2. And we assume there exist a<d and b<c.
A
B
To share Not to share
To share a+b, a+b a–d, a+c
Not to share a+c, a–d a, a
Table 2. Payoff Matrix of Company A and B
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The expected revenue of A when it choose to share knowledge, the expected revenue of A
when it choose not to share knowledge, and the average expected revenue of A are defined in
Eq.11, 12, 13:
(11)
(12)
(13)
The replicator dynamics equation of A is:
(14)
When F(x) = 0，we can get two stable states: x = 0 and x = 1. We assume ,
when , there exist three cases: 
(14a) when , thus x = 0 is ESS;  
(14b) when , thus x = 1 is ESS;
(14c) when y = yD, F(x) ≡ 0, thus all x are ESS.
The expected revenue of B when it choose to share knowledge, the expected revenue of B
when it choose not to share knowledge, and the average expected revenue of B are defined in
Eq.15, 16, 17:
(15)
(16)
(17)
The replicator dynamics equation of B is:
(18)
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When G(y) = 0, we can get two stable states: y = 0 and y = 1.We assume  ，
when , there exist three cases:  
(18a) when , thus y = 0 is ESS;
(18b) when , thus y = 1 is ESS;
(18c) when x = xD, G(x) ≡ 0, thus all y are ESS.
The evolutionary game phase diagram of A and B is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Evolutionary Game Phase Diagram of A and B
The area of AOBD in Figure 2 is:
(19)
Obviously, there exist  and:
(20)
The smaller the area of AOBD is, the greater the probability of A and B finally both choose to
share knowledge is. Thus we can promote knowledge sharing between A and B by improving
a, b, c and reducing d.
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We illustrate this theory by using a simple case. We initially assume that a = 4, b = 4, c = 6,
and d = 15. When a is 5, 6, 7 while other parameters remain unchanged the evolutionary
game phase diagram of system is shown in Figure 3. When b is 6, 8, 10 while other
parameters remain unchanged the evolutionary game phase diagram of system is shown in
Figure 4. When c is 8, 10, 12 while other parameters remain unchanged the evolutionary game
phase diagram of system is shown in Figure 5. When d is 17, 19, 21 while other parameters
remain unchanged the evolutionary game phase diagram of system is shown in Figure6. 
Figures 3, 4, 5 verifies that the bigger a, b, c is, the smaller the area of AOBD is, that is the
greater the probability of A and B finally both choose to share knowledge is. Figure 6 verifies
that the smaller d is, the smaller the area of AOBD is, that is the greater the probability of A
and B finally both choose to share knowledge is.
3-1 a = 4, b = 4, c = 6, d= 15 3-2 a = 5, b = 4, c = 6, d= 15
3-3 a = 6, b = 4, c = 6, d= 15 3-4 a = 7, b = 4, c = 6, d= 15
Figure 3. Evolutionary Game Phase Diagram of System (when a is improved)
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4-1 a = 4, b = 4, c = 6, d= 15 4-2 a = 4, b = 6, c = 6, d= 15
4-3 a = 4, b = 8, c = 6, d= 15 4-4 a = 4, b = 10, c = 6, d= 15
Figure 4. Evolutionary Game Phase Diagram of System (when b is improved)
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5-1 a = 4, b = 4, c = 6, d= 15 5-2 a = 4, b = 4, c = 8, d= 15
5-3 a = 4, b = 4, c = 10, d= 15 5-4 a = 4, b = 4, c = 12, d= 15
Figure 5. Evolutionary Game Phase Diagram of System (when c is improved)
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6-1 a = 4, b = 4, c = 6, d= 15 6-2 a = 4, b = 4, c = 6, d= 17
6-3 a = 4, b = 4, c = 6, d= 19 6-4 a = 4, b = 4, c = 6, d= 21
Figure 6. Evolutionary Game Phase Diagram of System (when d is improved)
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6. Influencing Factors for Knowledge Sharing
Many factors may influence knowledge sharing between supply chain members in supply chain
collaborative innovation.
6.1. Trust
Knowledge sharing occurs between all supply chain members. Li et al. believed trust has a
close relationship with the wiliness to share knowledge (Li & Liu, 2014). Wang et al. proposed
trust is the main reason to promote knowledge sharing. If all members do not trust each
other， they cannot share knowledge in the long term (Wang & Yang, 2012). In most cases,
supply chain members care their profits at first and build trust with each other by contracting.
But in the supply chain collaborative innovation environment, although there is a collaborative
innovation goal, because the result of collaborative innovation may vary according to each
different type of collaborative innovation, which leads to companies get different benefits.
Therefore, it is hard for supply chain members to trust each other and to provide their entire
knowledge, which makes knowledge sharing difficult to continue. Thus, solving the problem of
trust between enterprises in the supply chain collaborative innovation environment is a
prerequisite and necessary condition of knowledge sharing. Moreover, trust is a kind of
emotion, in order to make supply chain members trust each other, employees’ thought and
emotion are key factors that cannot be ignored.
6.2. Knowledge Protection
In order to achieve the goal of collaborative innovation, supply chain members will provide the
majority of their knowledge, including their core knowledge. Because the core knowledge is the
most important secret of a company, the protection of a company’s core knowledge influences
the company’s wiliness to share knowledge. Wang et al. believed establishing a knowledge
protection mechanism can encourage members to share knowledge (Wang & Zhang, 2008). A
company can protect its knowledge by taking the following measures:
(1) When supply chain members sharing their knowledge, not all employees can acquire all the
knowledge in the knowledge sharing platform. Employees of different level can get the
appropriate kind of knowledge. For example, the general level of corporate employees can only
get the general explicit knowledge, which can help them understand the processes of the
supply chain. And only the employees whose job is closely related to the core technology can
acquire the core knowledge. Moreover, these employees should sign a confidentiality
agreement and strictly compliance with it.
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(2) Supply chain members should develop a unified confidential agreement, which specifies
how to punish employees who leak knowledge, when they share knowledge with each other.
Meanwhile, training employees of each company to develop their sense of confidentiality and
make sure they are able to strictly observe the agreement.
6.3. Cultural Differences
Although all companies are in the same supply chain, different companies have their own
unique corporate culture. Corporate culture is a kind of value or entrepreneurial spirit that is
complied by all of the employees in this company. Jin et al. proposed corporate culture
influences the company’s wiliness to share knowledge (Jin, Yang, Huang & Wu, 2013). And the
cooperation of enterprises needs the integration of corporate cultures, thus, knowledge sharing
between supply chain members also requires the integration of corporate cultures.
Meanwhile, corporate culture plays a very important role in knowledge sharing. In 1999,
Donoghue, Harris and Weitzman thought different business processes and corporate culture
result in different knowledge management methods, which may at last influence the process of
knowledge sharing, including knowledge mining and knowledge transferring. 
6.4. Role of Core Enterprise
In each case of supply chain collaborative innovation, the core enterprise varies depend on
different innovation content and innovation subject. For example, in collaborative product
innovation, the manufacturer is the core enterprise; it should play as a guide and led the
knowledge sharing in the collaborative innovation environment.
7. Conclusions
This paper analyses the mechanism of knowledge sharing among enterprises in supply chain
collaborative innovation. By reviewing the literatures on supply chain collaborative innovation,
knowledge sharing and knowledge sharing mechanism, we break knowledge sharing process in
supply chain collaborative innovation into knowledge mining and knowledge transferring. We
analyze the number of supply chain members’ knowledge production by game theory. And we
analyze the result of knowledge sharing between two companies by evolutionary game. Then,
we analyze influencing factors of knowledge sharing between supply chain members in supply
chain collaborative innovation. The implementation of knowledge sharing mechanisms is
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complex and depends on different facts. Because different supply chains have different traits
and demands, it requires researchers to deepen related study.
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